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Under-reaction in the Sovereign CDS Market
Abstract

The sovereign CDS market has been growing rapidly in recent years, with a gross notional
amount of around 2 trillion dollars in 2015. We document a strong momentum effect in this
market. Its unique feature is that this momentum strategy returns are positively skewed and
higher during recessions. Hence, this effect cannot be attributed to momentum crash risk or
exposure to business cycles. Our evidence is consistent with the interpretation that the effect is
due to investors’ initial underreaction to sovereign credit information followed by corrections,
especially during public announcements of credit rating or outlook changes of the underlying
countries.

JEL Classification Numbers: G12.
Keywords: Underreaction, Macro information, Sovereign CDS, predictability, limits to arbitrage.

I.

Introduction

A sovereign CDS contract allows market participants to purchase or sell protection against the
default risk of a sovereign government. The sovereign CDS market has been growing rapidly in
the past decade. According to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, the aggregate
notional amount of sovereign CDS contracts is around $2 trillion in 2015. Our paper examines
the momentum strategy in this large and fast-growing market, and its potential causes.
Given the extensive momentum literature since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), why is it
worthwhile examining this phenomenon in yet another market? In addition to the fact that the
sovereign CDS market is enormous and fast growing, this market has two unique features that
separate our study from the rest of the literature. First, the investors in this market are almost
exclusively sophisticated financial institutions. Hence, one might expect that these institutions
are less subject to behavioral biases, since it is not obvious whether individual biases would
manifest themselves in the decision making of sophisticated institutions. Many prior studies
mostly focus on stock markets, where naïve investors are expected to be more prevalent. 1 Even
in derivative markets and currency markets, retail investors can be quite active. Hence, by
focusing on a market with sophisticated institutions, our paper sheds new light on the momentum
literature. Indeed, as explained in detail later, the sovereign CDS momentum returns display
several unique features relative to all those documented in other markets.
Second, the information structure in the sovereign CDS market helps shed light on the
mechanism behind the momentum effect in this market. As summarized in Barberis and Thaler
(2003), behavioral models of momentum can be classified along two dimensions: the
information structure and the cause of momentum. Along the information structure dimension: a
1

According French (2008), direct holdings account for half of the U.S. stock market in the 1980s. Even though
direct holdings have been declining, it still accounts for more than 20% in 2007.
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key distinction is whether the information in the model is public or private. In the sovereign CDS
market, the main information is about macro-level variables (e.g., the creditworthiness of
sovereign governments). Hence, most of the information is arguably publicly available. Given
the sophistication of the investors in this market, it is perhaps reasonable to expect most of them
to have the capacity to process the information. Hence, models based on public information (e.g.,
Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and De Long et al. (1990)) perhaps are more suitable for
explaining the momentum phenomenon in the sovereign CDS market. Moreover, as explained in
detail later, our evidence on the properties of the momentum returns can help further distinguish
models along the second dimension (i.e., the cause of momentum) and shed further light on the
mechanism behind the momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market.
We obtain sovereign CDS market data on 91 countries during 2001 to 2015. Following
Berndt and Obreja (2010), we construct the monthly sovereign “CDS returns,” which effectively
measure the sovereign CDS market implied excess returns from the exposure to the underlying
sovereign credit risk. Our main findings are the following.
First, we document a strong momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market. Specifically,
we sort countries into 5 quintiles based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns. Quintile-1
countries have the highest sovereign CDS returns, i.e., their credit worthiness improved the most
according to the sovereign CDS market, while quintile-5 countries have the lowest sovereign
CDS returns. We find strong evidence that the sovereign CDS of quintile-1 countries continue to
outperform that of quintile-5 countries. In particular, we form an equal-weighted portfolio of
sovereign CDS for each quintile. During the first month after the sorting, the quintile-1 portfolio
outperforms the quintile-5 portfolio by 0.58% per month (t=3.18). After accounting for the
exposures to the sovereign CDS market return factor and the global value and momentum factors
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in Asness, Moskowitz and Pederson (2013), the long-short strategy return is still 0.55% per
month (t=3.20).
One might be concerned that the above momentum returns are driven mostly by CDS
contracts that are on small economies and not actively traded. Without detailed data on the total
size of the outstanding sovereign CDS contracts for each country, however, we form GDPweighted sovereign CDS portfolios to give lower weights to smaller economies and the resulting
momentum returns remain very similar. We also find that the sovereign CDS momentum effect
is robust for various sorting periods and holding periods. For example, for the one-month holding
period, the long-short portfolio return is 0.46% per month (t=2.67) and 0.45% per month (t=2.81)
when the sorting period is one month and six months, respectively. The long-short return only
gradually becomes insignificant when the holding period becomes longer than 6 months.
Second, in contrast to the evidence on the momentum effect in other markets, sovereign
CDS momentum returns are positively skewed and higher during recessions. For instance, for the
strategy with a three-month sorting period and a one-month holding period, the skewness of the
long-short return is 2.94 (t=2.92). Moreover, the average return during the two recessions in our
sample is 1.43% per month, while that for the non-recession period is only 0.41% per month,
with the t-statistic for the return difference being 2.24. Hence, the sovereign CDS momentum
returns cannot be attributed to momentum crash risk (Daniel and Moskowitz (2016)) or the
exposure to the business cycle (Asness, Frazzini, Israel, Moskowitz (2014)).
Third, consistent with the interpretation that the sovereign CDS momentum is due to
underreaction, the average momentum strategy return increases with the holding period, and that
there appears to be no reversal. For instance, the cumulative alpha is 0.55% (t=3.20), 1.11%
(t=3.04), and 1.50% (t=2.47) if the holding period is 1, 3, and 6 months, respectively. The
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cumulative alpha gradually loses statistical significance when the holding period further
increases. This evidence is consistent with the interpretation of initial under-reaction followed by
correction. There is no evidence of overreaction.
Fourth, the timing of the sovereign CDS momentum returns is consistent with the
interpretation that the sovereign CDS market underreacts to the information on the
creditworthiness of the underlying countries and the momentum strategy generates profits when
this undereraction is eventually corrected. When should the correction happen? A natural
conjecture is perhaps when the sovereign credit information becomes public, i.e., when credit
rating or outlook changes are announced. This conjecture implies that the sovereign CDS
momentum strategy should be more profitable around the time when credit rating agencies, such
as the Standard & Poor’s, announce changes in credit ratings or outlooks. Indeed, our estimates
show that the profit of the sovereign CDS momentum strategy is accrued mostly during those
announcement months. We further separately analyze the profit from the long and short legs of
the momentum strategy, and find that the momentum profit is from both legs. The profit from the
short leg (i.e., buying protections) is concentrated almost entirely during announcement months.
In contrast, the profit from the long leg is distributed more evenly across time. That is, while
good news (i.e., upgrade in outlook or rating) tends to be incorporated into sovereign CDS
spreads gradually, bad news tends to be incorporated in sovereign CDS spreads more abruptly
around announcements.
Fifth, we decompose sovereign CDS returns into a global component and a countryspecific component, and find that both components contribute to the momentum returns. This
test is motivated by the evidence in Xiao, Yan, and Zhang (2018) that sovereign CDS returns can
predict future stock index returns, sovereign bond yields, as well real macroeconomic variables
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such as GDP and PMI, and that the predictive power is almost entirely from the global, rather
than country-specific, component of sovereign CDS returns. However, our evidence suggests
that both components have predictive power for future sovereign CDS returns in the crosssection, and hence contribute to the momentum effect.
Finally, we follow Moskowitz, Ooi, and Pedersen (2012) to analyze the time-series
momentum in the sovereign CDS market. We find significant time-series momentum returns for
various sorting and holding periods, although their economic magnitude is much smaller relative
to that of cross-sectional momentum strategies. For example, for a 3-month sorting period and a
1-month holding period, the time series momentum return is 0.19% per month (t=2.93), which is
less than one third of the return from a similar cross-sectional momentum strategy.
As pointed in Barberis and Thaler (2003), behavioral models of momentum can be
classified by the two causes of momentum: initial under-reaction followed by correction and
initial overreaction followed by even more overreaction. Those models can also be classified by
the two information structure: models with public information and models with private
information. Hence, one can classify the four major behavioral models as follows: Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) is based on public information and underreaction, while De Long et
al. (1990) is based on public information and overreaction. Both Hong and Stein (1999) and
Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyan (1998) are based on private information. The former is
based on underreaction while that latter overreaction. As argued earlier, public information likely
plays a more dominant role in the sovereign CDS market. Hence, our evidence on underreaction
suggests that the sovereign CDS momentum is perhaps better described by the model in Barberis,
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998).

5

Since Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), there has been a vast literature on momentum, which
is too large to be summarized in detail here, and has been surveyed in multiple studies (see, e.g.,
Asness et al 2014). The literature has examined momentum for a variety of markets, such as
corporate bonds, loans, and CDSs (e.g., Jostova et al. (2013), Beyhaghi and Ehsani (2017), and
Lee et al. (2014)), stock indices (e.g., Bhojraj and Swaminathan (2006) and Richards (1997)),
futures markets (e.g., Asness et al. (2014) and Moskowitz et al. (2012)), currency markets
(Menkhoff et al. (2012)), and sport betting markets (Moskowitz (2016)). Our paper complements
this literature by analyzing a market where public information plays a dominant role and
investors are primarily sophisticated financial institutions. Moreover, the momentum literature
often focuses on micro-level information, our paper adds to this literature by focusing on macro
information. The unique features of sovereign CDS momentum are that sovereign CDS
momentum returns are positively skewed and higher during recessions. These features make it
more challenging to attribute the momentum returns to arbitrageurs concerns of crash risk and
exposures to business cycles.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the data used in this
study. The main analysis is presented in Section III, and Section IV concludes.

II.

Data

In the sovereign CDS market, investors can purchase or sell protections against the default risk
of sovereign governments. 2 During the term of a sovereign CDS contract, the buyer makes
quarterly payments, which are often referred to as CDS coupons or spreads, to the seller in
exchange for the seller’s promise of protection. The sovereign CDS spreads are paid on the 20th
day of March, June, September and December. If a credit event occurs, the protection buyer will
2

See Augustin et al (2018) for more details on the sovereign CDS market.
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be compensated by the loss at the credit event. Credit events include failure to pay, moratorium,
obligation acceleration, and restructuring. The occurrence of a credit event is determined by the
ISDA Credit Derivatives Determinations Committees. In most cases, sovereign CDSs are settled
by cash with an auction process, in which the CDS seller makes a cash payment based on an
auction-generated market price of certain eligible debt obligation of the sovereign government.
An alternative is the “physical settlement”, in which the protection buyers tender an eligible
bond to the sellers and receive the par value of the bond. The market for sovereign CDS has been
growing rapidly in the past decades. According to the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation,
the aggregate notional amount of sovereign CDS contracts is around $2 trillion in 2015,
accounting for around 15% of all credit derivatives.
Our sovereign CDS data are from the Markit Group, which collects daily sovereign CDS
quotation data from major CDS dealers to construct average CDS spreads. We focus on US
dollar denominated CDS contracts with a five-year maturity and default tier being the senior
unsecured debt, as these contracts are most widely traded and have the highest market liquidity.
Our sample is from January 2001 to September 2015. There are 29 countries with active
sovereign CDS contracts in our sample in 2001. This number has been increasing steadily and is
91 by 2015. In the appendix, we list all the countries in our sample, and the starting time of the
sovereign CDS data for each country.
We follow Berndt and Obreja (2010) to construct the monthly sovereign “CDS returns.”
Specifically, the “return” of a CDS contract during a month is computed as the ratio of the markto-the-market profit/loss during the month to the notional amount, where the mark-to-the-market
profit/loss is computed from the perspective of the protection seller, and is estimated based on
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the widely used ISDA CDS model. 3 As pointed out in Berndt and Obreja (2010), this return
effectively measures the sovereign CDS market implied excess returns from exposures to the
underlying sovereign credit risk. As argued in Longstaff et al (2011), there are a number of
advantages in using the sovereign CDS data to estimate sovereign credit spreads, relative to
directly using sovereign debt data. Note that, according to this definition of sovereign CDS
returns, as the underlying country’s creditworthiness improves, its sovereign CDS returns
increases. That is, a high sovereign CDS return is “good news” about the underlying country’s
creditworthiness.
We follow Xiao, Yan and Zhang (2018) to measure the monthly CDS returns based on
the CDS spreads on the 20th of a month and on the 19th of the next month to make sure that the
CDSs on these two dates have the same expiration date. Specifically, there are four coupon
payment dates, the so-called IMM dates, each year: March 20, June 20, September 20 and
December 20. All CDS contracts initiated between two IMM dates expire on the same day. After
each IMM date, however, contracts with a new maturity date start trading. These new contracts
are said to be “on-the-run” until the next IMM date. Our sovereign CDS data are based on onthe-run contracts. Hence, a contract on the 20th of a month and a contract on the 19th of the next
month always expire on the same day. 4
Table 1 provides summary statistics of our sovereign CDS data. The average CDS spread
is 241 bps with a standard deviation of 556 bps. The monthly sovereign CDS return has a mean
of 0.02% and a standard deviation of 2.59%.

3

See O’Kane (2008) for more details. To implement this valuation model, we assume a constant hazard
rate and a 40% recovery rate, and use the LIBOR term structure as the discount rates.
4
As a counter example, a contract on the 15th of a month and a contract on the 14th of the next month do
not always have the same expiration date. For example, a contract on March 15 and a contract on April 14
have different expiration dates.
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III. Empirical Results
A.

Cross-sectional momentum
We sort countries into 5 quintiles based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns.

Quintile-1 countries have the highest returns, i.e., their credit worthiness improved the most
according to the sovereign CDS market, while quintile-5 countries have the lowest sovereign
CDS returns. Then, we form equal weighted portfolios of sovereign CDS contracts for each
quintile. The portfolio returns during the first month after this sorting are reported in Panel A of
Table 2.
The average return of the winner portfolio (quintile 1) is 0.26% per month, while that of
the loser portfolio (quintile 5) is -0.32% per month. That is, the winner portfolio, on average,
outperforms the loser one by 0.58% per month, or 6.96% per year, with a t-statistic of 3.18.
Hence, our evidence suggests a strong momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market.
To account the risk factors in the existing literature, we regress the long-short strategy
returns on a number of factors. The regression results are reported in Panel B of Table 2. For the
regression in the first column, we include the market factor, which is constructed as the monthly
equally-weighted sovereign CDS portfolio. The resulting alpha is 0.58% per month (t = 3.61)
and is almost the same as the original average long-short return. In the second column, we also
include the global value and momentum factors from Asness, Moskowitz and Pederson (2013),
and the momentum alpha is 0.55% per month (t=3.20) in this specification.
One might be concerned that the above momentum returns are driven mostly by CDS
contracts that are on small economies and not actively traded. Without detailed data on the total
size of the outstanding sovereign CDS contracts for each country, however, we form GDPweighted sovereign CDS portfolios to give lower weights to smaller economies. As shown in the
9

third row of Panel A, the results based on GDP-weighted portfolios remain very similar. For
example, the long-short portfolio return is 0.60% per month (t=2.46). Moreover, we regress this
GDP-weighted long-short strategy return on the previously mentioned factors. As shown in
columns three and four of Panel B, the alpha is 0.61% per month (t=2.75) when we account for
the market factor, and is 0.50% per month (t=2.33) when we also add the global value and
momentum factors. Hence, the sovereign CDS momentum effect is not mostly driven by very
small economies.
We conducted a number of subsample analyses. As shown in the first two rows of Panel
C, the average momentum return is 0.54% (t=2.70) and 0.61% (t=2.16) in the first and second
halves of our sample, respectively. We also split our sample according to the development status
of the underlying countries. Specifically, we partition our sample into a subsample of developing
economies and one for developed economies, based on the classification by the International
Monetary Fund. 5 As shown in the third and fourth rows, the average sovereign CDS momentum
return is 0.41% (t=2.29) and 0.66% per month (t=2.32) for the developed and developing
economy subsamples, respectively.
The above analysis is based on a three-month sorting period and a one-month holding
period. To examine the robustness of those results, we repeat the analysis by varying the sorting
and holding periods. As shown in the first row of Panel D, where the holding period is one
month, the momentum alpha remains similar when the sorting period varies from one to six
months. When the holding period increases to six months, as shown in the first three rows, the
magnitude of the momentum alpha decreases gradually, but remains statistically significant.
When we further increase the holding period to 12 months, the alpha gradually decreases and
becomes statistically insignificant.
5

See, https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/groups.htm.
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B.

Unique features of sovereign CDS momentum returns
The sovereign CDS momentum returns appear unique relative to the momentum returns

in other markets. First, sovereign CDS returns are positively skewed. As noted in and Daniel and
Moskowitz (2016), the momentum strategy returns across many asset classes are subject to
infrequent but significant crashes. They document momentum cashes in all the markets in their
sample, which include four equity markets, index futures, commodity, fixed income, as well as
currency. Chabot, Ghysels, and Jagannathan (2014) document momentum crashes during the
pre-CRSP period for both the US and the UK stock markets. In contrast, the skewness of the
momentum returns in our sample is 2.94 (t=2.92). That is, this momentum strategy appears to
have infrequent but large gains, rather than losses. Unlike the momentum strategies in other
markets, the momentum strategy in the sovereign CDS market appears not exposed to crash risk
in our sample.
Note that, during our sample period, there are a number of credit events, which lead to
large negative sovereign CDS returns. One might be concerned that the previously reported mean
and skewness of the sovereign CDS momentum strategy returns are mostly driven by those
extreme returns. However, due to our large sample size, those observations have only small
effects on the mean and skewness of sovereign CDS momentum returns. For example, we repeat
our analysis after excluding those extreme returns in our sample. The resulting mean and
skewness of sovereign CDS momentum returns remain similar.
Second, the sovereign CDS momentum strategy appears to perform better during
recessions. Asness et al. (2014) find that momentum strategies tend to perform worse during
recessions, especially for the strategies based on non-stock asset classes. Daniel and Moskowitz
(2016) also find that momentum strategies tend to have poor performances during bad times. For
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example, momentum crashes tend occur in panic states, following market declines and when
market volatility is high. To examine the cyclicality of the sovereign CDS momentum returns,
we plot the cumulative return from the momentum strategy over time for strategies with various
sorting periods in Figure 1. MOM (6,1) refers to the cumulative return from the strategy with a
six-month sorting period and a one-month holding period. MOM (1,1) and MOM (3,1) are
defined similarly. The two shaded areas correspond to the NBER recessions in the U.S. The
striking pattern of the figure is that the momentum strategy returns tend to increase significantly
during the two recessions.
To test this more formally, we analyze the returns of these three strategies during the
recession and non-recession sample periods. As shown in Panel E of Table 2, the average return
for strategy MOM (3,1) is 1.43% during the two recessions, and is only 0.41% during the rest of
our sample. The t-statistic for the difference between the two average returns is 2.24. Similarly,
the momentum strategy outperforms during recessions for both MOM(1,1) and MOM (6,1). For
example, the mean return for strategy MOM (6,1) is 1.71% and 0.25% per month during the
recession and non-recession periods, respectively. The performance difference is 1.47% per
month, with a t-statistic of 3.14.

C.

Interpretation
As summarized in Barberis and Thaler (2003), behavioral models of momentum can be

classified by the two causes of momentum: initial underreaction followed by correction and
initial overreaction followed by even more overreaction. If the momentum strategy return is due
to overreaction, the alpha of the momentum trading strategy should revert back towards zero
when the holding period is increased. On the other hand, if the momentum return is due to
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underreaction followed by correction, the alpha of the momentum strategy should increase with
the holding period, and eventually stabilize.
To distinguish these two interpretations, we examine the alphas of the momentum
strategy for longer holding periods. In particular, we compute the alphas the long-short strategies
based on a three-month sorting period and various holding periods. As shown in Panel D of
Table 2, the cumulative alpha during the holding period is 0.55%, 1.11% (=0.37%×3), and 1.50%
(=0.25%×6) if the holding period is 1, 3, and 6 months, respectively. The alpha gradually loses
statistical significance when the holding period increases further. We plot this holding period
cumulative alpha against the holding period in Figure 2, which shows that the holding period
alpha increases with the holding period, and the increase slows down after 3 months. There is no
sign of reversion back towards zero when we further increase the holding period, although the
alpha becomes statistically insignificant when the holding period is longer than 9 months. This is
consistent with the underreaction interpretation that sovereign CDS market gradually
incorporates information into prices and there is no evidence of overshooting.
C.1. Timing of momentum profits
What is the information that sovereign CDS market underreacts to? A natural candidate is
perhaps the sovereign creditworthiness. The momentum strategy generates profits when this
undereraction is eventually corrected. When should the correction happen, so that sovereign CDS
spreads “catch up” with reality? A natural conjecture is perhaps when that sovereign credit
information becomes public, i.e., when credit rating or outlook changes are publically announced.
This conjecture implies that the sovereign CDS momentum strategy should be more profitable
around the time when credit rating agencies, such as the Standard & Poor’s, announce changes in
credit ratings or outlooks.
13

To test this implication, we first construct an indicator variable Iit, which is 1 if country i
is in quintile 1 according to the sorting by sovereign CDS returns during months t-2 to t (i.e., the
sovereign CDS market indicates that the creditworthiness of country i improved the most during
the recent three months), is -1 if country i is in quintile 5, and is 0 if country i is in the other three
quintiles.
The momentum effect implies that this indicator variable Ii,t should predict future
sovereign CDS returns. We confirm this by regressing ri,t, the return of the sovereign CDS on
country i in month t, on Ii,t-1, with country fixed effects and month fixed effects. As shown in the
first column of Panel A of Table 3, the coefficient of Ii,t-1 is 0.21 (t=2.47). This estimate reflects
the momentum effect analyzed previously: the monthly sovereign CDS returns of the countries
in the top (bottom) quintile, which is sorted based on the previous 3 month CDS returns, is 21
basis points higher (lower) than that of the middle 3 quintiles.
We can now test the implication that the momentum strategy should be more profitable
around the time when credit rating or outlook changes are announced. Specifically, we construct
a dummy variable Dit, which is 1 if there is a credit rating or outlook change on country i in
month t by Standard & Poor’s, and 0 otherwise. We then regress ri,t, the return of the sovereign
CDS on country i in month t, on the interaction term between Iit-1 and Dit. Our prediction that
sovereign CDS momentum strategy should be more profitable during announcement months
implies that the coefficient of the interaction term should be positive.
Indeed, as shown in the second column of Panel A of Table 3, the coefficient of the
interaction term Iit-1×Dit is 1.42 (t=3.24). Note that the coefficient of Iit-1 is 0.10 (t=1.31). Hence,
the coefficient of the interaction term is more than 14 times the coefficient for Iit-1. That is, the
predictive power of Iit-1 is more than 14 times stronger during announcement months than during
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other periods. When there is a public announcement of credit rating or outlook change, which
has been partially anticipated by the sovereign CDS market, the creditworthiness information is
more fully incorporated into prices. As a result, the sovereign CDS momentum profit is 14 times
stronger during credit-event months than during other periods. This timing of the sovereign CDS
momentum returns is consistent with the interpretation of under-reaction followed by correction.
C.2. Long and short legs
We separately analyze the profit from the long and short legs of the momentum strategy.
Specifically, we construct two dummy variables I_Goodi,t and I_Badi,t, where I_Goodi,t (I_Badi,t)
is set to 1 if country i is in quintile 1 (5) according to the sorting by sovereign CDS returns
during months t-2 to t, and zero otherwise. We then regress ri,t, the return of the sovereign CDS
of country i in month t, on I_Goodi,t-1 and I_Badi,t-1, with country fixed effects and month fixed
effects. As shown in the first column of Panel B of Table 3, the coefficient of I_Goodi,t-1 is 0.24
(t=2.38). That is, the sovereign CDSs of quintile-1 countries outperform those of quintiles 2
through 4 by 0.24% per month. Similarly, the coefficient of I_Badi,t-1, is -0.18 (t=1.78), which
suggests that the sovereign CDSs of quintile-5 countries underperform those of quintiles 2
through 4 by 0.18% per month. That is, both the long and short legs of the strategy contribute to
the momentum profits.
To further examine the timing of the momentum profits from the long and short legs, we
include the interaction terms between these two dummy variables and the credit event dummy Dit.
As shown in the second column of Panel B, the coefficient of I_Badi,t-1, is 0.00 (t=0.00), while
that of the interaction term I_Badi,t-1×Dit is -2.59 (t=3.18). That is, the profit from the short leg is
concentrated almost entirely during announcement months. In contrast, the coefficient of
I_Goodi,t-1 is 0.21 (t=2.02), while the coefficient of I_Goodi,t-1×Dit is insignificant. That is, the
15

profit from the long leg is distributed more evenly across time. In other words, while the
underreaction to good news (i.e., upgrades in outlook or rating) tends to be corrected gradually
over time, the underrection to bad news tends to be corrected more abruptly around the
announcements.
As summarized in Barberis and Thaler (2003), there are two prominent models of
momentum based on underreaction: Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) and Hong and Stein
(1999). The former is based on public information while the latter private information. The most
important information in the sovereign CDS market is perhaps the information about macro
variables, such as the credit worthiness of sovereign countries. Arguably most of the information
in this market is public. Moreover, investors in this market are mostly sophisticated financial
institutions. Hence, it is perhaps reasonable to expect most of them to be able to process the
information. Therefore, our evidence suggests that the sovereign CDS momentum effect is
perhaps better described by a public information based model, such as Barberis, Shleifer, and
Vishny (1998).

D.

Global vs. local information
Xiao, Yan, and Zhang (2018) find that sovereign CDS returns can predict future stock

index returns, sovereign bond yields, as well real macroeconomic variables such as GDP and
PMI. Interestingly, they find that the predictive power is almost entirely from the global, rather
than country-specific, component of sovereign CDS returns. Motivated by these results, we
decompose sovereign CDS returns into a global component and a country-specific component by
a simple market model, and examine which component contributes to the momentum effect, i.e.,
has the predictive power for future sovereign CDS returns.
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The return decomposition is based on a 12-month rolling window regression of CDS
returns on the market factor, which is constructed as the average sovereign CDS returns across
all countries in our sample. For each sovereign CDs contract, we regress its return on the market
factor. The regression residuals are classified as the country-specific component of sovereign
CDS return. The remaining portion of the sovereign CDS returns is classified as the global
component.
Which component has predictive power for future sovereign CDS returns? To analyze
this, we first repeat our portfolio sorting analysis in Tables 2, using the two components as the
sorting variables. That is, we first sort countries into 5 quintiles based on the global component
of sovereign CDS returns. Quintile-1 countries have the highest global component of sovereign
CDS returns in the previous three months, while quintile-5 countries have the lowest global
component returns. We then form equal weighted portfolios of sovereign CDS contracts for each
quintile. The portfolio returns during the first month after the sorting are reported in the first row
of Panel A of Table 4. It shows that the quintile-1 portfolio outperforms the quintile-5 portfolio
by 0.44% (t=2.64) per month. Similarly, we sort countries by the country-specific component of
sovereign CDS returns. In this case, as shown in the second row, the quintile-1 portfolio
outperforms the quintile-5 one by 0.30% (t=2.00) per month. As a comparison, the last row
reports the portfolio results when the sorting variable is the total sovereign CDS return for the
same sample period as those for the previous two rows. In this case, the long-short return is 0.52%
(t=3.21) per month.
We also control for the same risk factors as those in Table 2. As shown in the last column
of Panel A of Table 4, the resulting alphas are almost the same as the original long-short returns.
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Hence, our evidence suggests that both the global and the country-specific components of
sovereign CDS returns can predict future CDS returns.
We further examine this predictability in panel regressions. Specifically, we extend the
analysis in Panel A of Table 3 by replacing the indicator variable Ii,t by I_SYSi,t and I_IDIOi,t.
Similar to the definition of Ii,t, I_SYSi,t is 1 if country i is in quintile 1 according to the sorting by
the global component of sovereign CDS returns during months t-2 to t, is -1 if country i is in
quintile 5, and is 0 if country i is in the other three quintiles. The indicator variable I_IDIOi,t is
based on the country-specific component of sovereign CDS returns, and is defined similarly.
To examine the marginal predictive power of I_SYSit and I_IDIOit, we regress rit, the
return of the sovereign CDS on country i in month t on I_SYSi,t-1 and I_IDIOi,t-1, with country
fixed effects and month fixed effects. As shown in the first column of Panel B of Table 4, the
coefficients of I_SYSi,t-1 is 0.22 (t=2.25), which reflects the marginal predictive power of the
global component of sovereign CDS returns. Everything else being equal, the monthly sovereign
CDS returns of the countries in the top (bottom) quintile, which is sorted based on the global
component of sovereign CDS returns during the previous 3 months, is 22 basis point higher
(lower) than that of the middle 3 quintiles. Similarly, the coefficient of I_IDIOi,t-1 is 0.14 (t=2.25).
Hence, both the global and country-specific components have marginal predictive power for
future sovereign CDS returns, although the magnitude of the predictability of the countryspecific component is smaller.
Finally, we also include the interaction terms between credit event dummy Di,t and the
two indicator variables I_SYSi,t-1 and I_IDIOi,t-1. As shown in the second column of Panel B, the
coefficient I_IDIOi,t-1×Dit is 1.42 (t=3.30). Note that the coefficient of I_IDIOi,t-1 is 0.019
(t=0.36). Hence, the profit from the long-short strategy based on the country-specific component

18

of sovereign CDS returns is almost entirely concentrated around credit event months. That is, the
underreaction to country-specific information is mostly corrected during announcement months.
However, this is not the case for the long-short portfolio based on the global component. The
coefficient of I_SYSi,t-1×Dit is statistically insignificant. Hence, the profit from the long-short
strategy based on the global component of sovereign CDS returns is more dispersed over time. In
the other words, the correction to the underreaction to the global information is more gradual
over time.

E.

Time series momentum
Following Moskowitz et al. (2012), we also investigate the time series momentum, which

is related to, but different from the above cross-sectional momentum. The cross-sectional
momentum return is due to the fact that securities, which outperformed (underperformed) their
peers recently, tend to continue outperforming (underperforming) their peers in the coming
months. In contrast, the time-series momentum strategy is to buy securities with positive past
returns and sell the securities with negative past returns. That is, the time series momentum
strategy is constructed based on each security’s own past returns, and there is no cross-sectional
comparison across assets. Moskowitz et al. (2012) find that there is significant time series
momentum returns in equity index, currency, commodity, and bond futures.
We sort countries into two groups based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns.
Group 1 consists of countries with negative sovereign CDS returns during the previous 3 months
while group 2 consists of countries with positive ones. Then, we form an equal-weighted
portfolio that is long in sovereign CDSs on group-2 countries and short in those on group-1
countries. For the one-month holding period, as shown in the first row of Table 5, the average
return of this long-short strategy is 0.19% per month (t=2.93). Although the time-series
19

momentum strategy return is statistically significant, its magnitude is less than one third of that
of the corresponding cross-sectional momentum strategy.
We repeat the above analysis by varying the sorting period from one to 12 months. As
shown in the first row of Table 5, the time series momentum return remains significant when the
sorting period is between one to nine months. We also vary the holding period from one to 12
months. As shown in Table 5, the average long-short strategy return is significantly positive
when the holding period is up to 6 months, and gradually become statistically insignificant when
we further increase the holding period.

IV.

Conclusion

This paper has documented a strong momentum effect in the sovereign CDS market. In
contrast to the evidence in other financial markets, the sovereign CDS momentum returns are
positively skewed, and higher during recessions. Hence, the sovereign CDS momentum returns
cannot be attributed to momentum crash risk or the exposure to business cycles. Our evidence is
consistent with the interpretation that the sovereign CDS momentum is due to investors’ initial
underreaction to public macro information followed by corrections, especially when there are
public announcements on credit rating or outlook changes.
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Table 1. Summary statistics
This table reports the summary statistics of CDS spread and CDS return. CDS spread is the daily
sovereign CDS spread, and is from Markit. CDS return is computed from the CDS spreads on the 20th of
a month and on the 19th of the next month. The monthly sovereign CDS return is computed as the ratio of
the mark-to-the-market profit/loss during the month to the notional amount, where the mark-to-the-market
profit/loss is computed from the perspective of the protection seller, and is estimated based on the ISDA
CDS model, where the hazard rate is a constant and the recovery rate is 40%, and the discount rates are
from the LIBOR term structure.

CDS spread (bps)
CDS return (%)

Mean

Std Dev

1st

25th

50th

75th

99th

N

240.56

555.71

1.74

36.66

119.28

276.43

1960.15

12193

0.02

2.59

-7.83

-0.22

0.01

0.37

6.64

12065
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Table 2. Cross-sectional Momentum
Countries are sorted into 5 quintiles based on their past 3-month sovereign CDS returns. Quintile 1 (5)
countries have the highest (lowest) CDS returns, i.e., their credit worthiness improved (deteriorated) the
most. Then, for each quintile, we form an equal weighted or GDP weighted portfolio of sovereign CDSs
and compute its return for the next month. Panel A reports the average return of each quintile portfolio,
and the long-short portfolio that is long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5. Panel B reports the results
from the regression of the monthly returns of the long-short portfolios on various factors. MKT is the
monthly return of the equal-weighted portfolio of all sovereign CDSs. VAL and MOM are the global
value and momentum factors in Asness, Moskowitz and Pederson (2013), and are obtained from the AQR
data library. Panel C reports the portfolio results based on subsamples. The first and send rows are based
on the sample period 2001 through 2007, and 2008 through 2015, respectively. The third and fourth rows
are based on, respectively, the subsamples of developed and developing economies, which are defined by
the IMF. Panel D reports the results based on various sorting and holding periods. Panel E reports the
average return of the long-short portfolio during the NBER-recession and non-recession periods.
MOM(n,h) refers to the portfolio with a n-month sorting period and h-month holding period. The tstatistics for skewness are based on bootstrapped standard errors. All other t-statistics are based on
standard errors that are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with 12 lags. All t-statistics are reported in
parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Panel A. Momentum returns in the sovereign CDS market

Equal weight

Mean (%)
Skewness

GDP weight

Mean (%)
Skewness

P1
(high)
0.26*
(1.88)
1.61**
(2.04)
0.18
(1.17)
0.09
(0.22)

P2

P3

P4

0.08
(1.04)
0.38
(-0.82)
0.05
(0.85)
0.13
(0.29)

-0.00
(-0.03)
-1.87
(-1.87)
0.02
(0.46)
0.73
(0.92)

-0.00
(0.02)
-1.64
(-0.90)
0.02
(0.31)
1.98
(0.84)
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P5
(low)
-0.32
(1.42)
-3.21**
(-2.69)
-0.42*
(1.70)
4.47**
(2.33)

P1-P5
0.58***
(3.18)
2.94***
(2.92)
0.60**
(2.46)
3.30*
(1.92)

Panel B. Sovereign CDS momentum alphas (%)

Alpha
MKT

Equal-weighted
Returns
0.58***
(3.61)
-0.83*
(1.90)

Equal-weighted
Returns
0.55***
(3.20)
0.89**
(2.11)
0.25
(1.39)
-0.01
(0.08)

GDP-Weighted
Returns
0.61***
(2.75)
1.21*
(1.91)

GDP-Weighted
Returns
0.50**
(2.33)
1.31**
(2.25)
0.56**
(2.05)
0.07
(0.42)

175
0.1346

175
0.1550

175
0.1593

175
0.2019

VAL
MOM

Observations
R-Square

Panel C. Sovereign CDS momentum returns in subsamples (%)

2001-2007
2008-2015
Developed
Developing

P1
(high)
0.30*
(1.85)
0.22
(1.05)
0.11
(1.40)
0.32
(1.53)

P2

P3

P4

0.11
(1.50)
0.05
(0.38)
0.02
(0.45)
0.06
(0.68)

0.00
(0.18)
0.00
(-0.07)
-0.00
(-0.02)
0.07
(0.81)

-0.00
(-0.21)
0.00
(-0.05)
0.01
(0.31)
0.05
(0.47)

P5
(low)
-0.23
(-0.80)
-0.39
(-1.20)
-0.29
(-1.45)
-0.35
(-1.08)

P1-P5
0.54**
(2.54)
0.61**
(2.16)
0.41**
(2.29)
0.66**
(2.32)

Panel D. Momentum alphas (%): n-month sorting period, h-month holding period
h=1
h=3
h=6
h=9
h=12

n=1
0.46***
(2.67)
0.39***
(3.67)
0.26***
(3.15)
0.12*
(1.85)
0.08
(1.17)

n=3
0.55***
(3.20)
0.37***
(3.04)
0.25**
(2.47)
0.15*
(1.68)
0.13
(1.61)
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n=6
0.45***
(2.81)
0.38***
(3.28)
0.20*
(1.82)
0.11
(1.06)
0.13
(1.32)

Panel E. Momentum returns through business cycles (%)
MOM(1,1)

Recession
1.38

Non-recession
0.31

MOM(3,1)

1.43

0.41

MOM(6,1)

1.71

0.25
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Difference
1.07**
(2.37)
1.02**
(2.24)
1.47***
(3.14)

Table 3. The timing of predictability
This table reports results from panel regressions. The dependent variable is ri,t, the sovereign CDS return
of country i in month t. Ii,t-1 is 1, if country i is in quintile 1 according to the sorting based on sovereign
CDS returns during months t-3 to t-1; is -1 if country i is in quintile 5, and is 0 if country i is in the other
three quintiles. Di,t is 1 if Standard & Poor’s announced a credit rating change or outlook change for
country i in month t, and 0 otherwise. I_Goodi,t-1 (I_Badi,t-1) is 1, if country i is in quintile 1 (5) according
to the sorting based on sovereign CDS returns during months t-3 to t-1, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics, in
parentheses, are based on standard errors that are clustered by month. ***, **, and * indicate significance
levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Ii,t-1
Ii,t-1×Di,t
Di,t

Panel A: Timing of predictability
Return (%)
Return (%)
0.21**
0.10
(2.47)
(1.31)
1.42***
(3.24)
-0.77***
(2.97)

Country Fixed Effects
Month Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
Yes
10,168
0.12
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Yes
Yes
10,168
0.13

I_Goodi,t-1

Panel B: Good vs. bad news
Return (%)
0.24**
(2.38)

I_Goodi,t-1×Di,t

Return (%)
0.21**
(2.02)
0.23
(0.58)

-0.18*

I_Badi,t-1

(1.78)
I_Badi,t-1×Di,t

0.00
(0.00)
-2.59***
(3.18)

Di,t

-0.17
(1.08)

Country Fixed Effects
Month Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared

Yes
Yes
10,168
0.12
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Yes
Yes
10,168
0.13

Table 4. Global vs. Country-specific
Panel A reports the returns of portfolios, which are sorted based on the global component of sovereign
CDS returns (row 1), the country-specific component (row 2), and the total return (row 3). The CDS
return decomposition is based on a 12-month rolling window regression of CDS returns on the average
CDS returns across all countries in our sample. The regression residual is the country-specific component
and the remaining portion of the CDS return is the global component. Since we need 12-month data to
estimate the regressions, the sample period of the portfolio returns is January 2002 to September 2015.
Countries are sorted into 5 quintiles. Quintile 1 (5) countries have highest (lowest) returns. Then, for each
quintile, we form an equal weighted portfolio of sovereign CDSs and compute its return for the next
month. Panel A reports the average return for each of the portfolios, and for the long-short portfolio that is
long in quintile 1 and short in quintile 5. The “alpha” column reports the alpha of the long-short strategy
after adjusting for MKT, VAL, and MOM, all of which are defined in Table 2. T-statistics are based on
standard errors that are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. Panel
B reports estimates of panel regressions. The dependent variable is ri,t, the return of the sovereign CDS of
country i in month t. I_Globali,t-1 is 1, if country i is in quintile 1 according to the sorting based on the
global component sovereign CDS returns during months t-3 to t-1, is set to -1 if country i is in quintile 5,
and is set to 0 if country i is in the other three quintiles. I_Countryi,t-1 is defined similarly based on the
country-specific component. Di,t is 1 if Standard & Poor’s announced a credit rating change or outlook
change for country i in month t, and 0 otherwise. T-statistics, in parentheses, are based on standard errors
that are clustered by month. ***, **, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

Sorting variable
Global
Country-specific
Total

P1
(high)
0.25
(1.63)
0.19
(1.08)
0.25*
(1.94)

Panel A: Portfolio returns (%)
P2
P3
P4
0.09
(0.95)
0.02
(0.27)
0.06
(0.82)

0.01
(0.18)
0.00
(0.07)
0.01
(0.11)
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-0.03
(-0.48)
0.05
(0.73)
-0.00
(-0.01)

P5
(low)
-0.19
(-0.94)
-0.12
(-0.53)
-0.27
(-1.37)

P1-P5

alpha

0.44***
(2.64)
0.30**
(2.00)
0.52***
(3.21)

0.44***
(2.65)
0.30**
(2.06)
0.52***
(3.25)

Panel B: Sovereign CDS return (%)
Return
Return
I_Globali,t-1
I_Countryi,t-1

0.22**

0.16*

(2.25)

(1.84)

0.14**

0.02

(2.25)

(0.36)

I_Globali,t-1×Di,t

0.64
(1.31)

I_Countryi,t-1×Di,t

1.42***
(3.30)

Di,t

0.58**
(2.46)

Country Fixed Effects
Month Fixed Effects
Observations
R-squared
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Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

9,892

9,892

0.17

0.18

Table 5. Time-series Momentum
Countries are sorted into two groups based on their past n-month sovereign CDS returns. Group 1 consists
of countries with negative sovereign CDS returns while group 2 consists of countries with positive ones.
Then, we form an equal-weighted portfolio that is long in sovereign CDSs on group-2 countries and short
in those on group-1 countries. These portfolios are held for h months before rebalancing. This table
reports average monthly returns from this time series momentum strategy. T-statistics are based on
standard errors that are Newey-West (1987) adjusted with 12 lags, and are reported in parentheses. ***,
**, and * indicate significance levels of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.

h=1
h=3
h=6
h=9
h=12

Time series momentum returns (%)
n=1
n=3
n=6
n=9
0.20**
0.19***
0.23***
0.13**
(2.53)
(2.93)
(2.66)
(2.22)
0.15***
0.11**
0.10***
0.09
(3.12)
(2.26)
(2.61)
(1.49)
0.07***
0.06*
0.06
0.05
(2.93)
(1.88)
(1.29)
(0.82)
0.04*
0.04
0.04
0.03
(1.69)
(1.30)
(0.99)
(0.58)
0.03
0.04
0.04
0.03
(1.50)
(1.41)
(0.91)
(0.44)
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n=12
0.08
(1.33)
0.06
(1.02)
0.04
(0.56)
0.03
(0.40)
0.02
(0.25)

Figure 1. Cumulative monthly returns during recession
This figure plots cumulative returns from three cross-sectional momentum strategies. MOM(6,1) is the
strategy with a 6-month sorting period and a 1-month holding period. MOM(3,1) and MOM(1,1) are
defined similarly. Details of the strategies are described in Table 2. Shaded areas correspond to two
NBER recessions from March 2001 to November 2001 and from December 2007 to June 2009.
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Figure 2. Sovereign CDS momentum alphas
The figure plots the alpha cumulated during the holding period of the sovereign CDS momentum strategy,
described in Table 2, against the holding period. All strategies have a 3-month sorting period. All alphas
are after controlling for MKT, VAL, and MOM, all of which are defined in Table 2.

1.8
1.6
1.4

Alpha (%)

1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Holding Period (month)

34

8

9

10

11

12

Appendix: The list of countries with sovereign CDS contracts
Country
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Austria
Australia
Barbados
Belgium
Bulgaria
Bahrain
Belize
Brazil
Tunisia
Canada
Chile
China
Hong Kong
Colombia
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech
Germany
Denmark
Dominica
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Estonia
Fiji
Finland
France
Greece
Guatemala
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
South Korea
Latvia

Starting time of CDS data
Sep-2008
Oct-2009
Apr-2001
Jul-2001
Oct-2003
Jul-2006
Mar-2001
May-2001
Aug-2004
Jan-2010
Feb-2001
Dec-2003
Oct-2003
Mar-2002
Feb-2001
Sep-2004
Apr-2001
Sep-2003
Feb-2001
Aug-2002
Apr-2001
Nov-2002
Dec-2002
Aug-2003
Jul-2003
Apr-2002
Jul-2003
Jul-2004
Jul-2007
Aug-2002
May-2002
Feb-2001
Sep-2003
Apr-2004
Aug-2003
Jan-2002
Mar-2006
Feb-2003
May-2001
Mar-2001
Oct-2003
Feb-2001
Oct-2003
Feb-2004
May-2001
Sep-2004

Country
Lebanon
Lithuania
Malaysia
Malta
Macedonia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
Nigeria
Norway
New Zealand
Oman
Pakistan
Panama
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Hungary
Georgia
Romania
Ghana
Russia
Saudi Arabia
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Serbia
Sri Lanka
Sweden
Switzerland
Taiwan
Thailand
Trinidad and Tobago
Turkey
UAE
United Kingdom
Ukraine
Uruguay
US
Venezuela
Vietnam
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Starting time of CDS data
Apr-2003
May-2002
May-2001
Aug-2004
Oct-2011
Feb-2001
May-2001
Sep-2003
Jan-2007
Nov-2003
Jan-2004
Dec-2008
Aug-2004
Mar-2002
Mar-2002
Apr-2001
Feb-2001
Mar-2002
Oct-2001
Apr-2001
Jul-2015
Apr-2002
Jun-2008
Oct-2001
Mar-2007
Aug-2003
Jun-2001
Mar-2002
Feb-2001
Mar-2001
Jul-2006
Jan-2008
Jul-2001
Jul-2007
Sep-2006
Apr-2001
Dec-2004
Feb-2001
Mar-2007
Apr-2006
Oct-2002
Jun-2002
Jan-2004
Mar-2001
Sep-2002

